Rights Defense Commentary: Feng Zhenghu: That “May Choose Not to Inform”—The Significance of Article 6 of the New Exit-Entry Regulations

The State Council’s Provisions on the Administration of Exit and Entry, promulgated on July 31, 2026, and effective September 15, contains few articles, but one sentence is worth considering repeatedly.

Article 6 states: For persons whose exit has been prohibited in accordance with the law, the decision-making authority shall promptly notify the immigration administration authority to enforce the decision, and "inform the person concerned in writing of the fact, reasons, legal basis and avenues for relief concerning the exit prohibition"; immediately following this is a qualification——"where there is a possibility of affecting national security, the investigation of criminal cases, or other circumstances, the person concerned may not be informed." The second paragraph provides that, when enforcing an exit prohibition decision, the immigration administration authority "shall inform the person concerned in accordance with the contents of the notification from the decision-making authority."

One sentence saying "shall inform" establishes the principle, one saying "may not inform" opens a gap, and another saying "inform in accordance with the contents of the notification" determines how much the port-of-entry window can say. The tension among these three sentences is where the true weight of this article lies.

I. It Is Not an Authorizing Provision for Prohibiting Exit

When discussing this article, the first thing that needs to be clarified is this: It governs how to explain the decision, not whether exit may be restricted.

The source of the power to prohibit exit is not Article 6, but other substantive rules. Articles 3 through 5 of these new provisions themselves address, respectively, false materials and false statements; obtaining documents by deception and being subject to administrative detention for illegal entry or exit (a prohibition on exit for six months to three years); illegal or criminal activities abroad that endanger national security and interests (six months to three years from the date of return to China); and circumstances in which violations of export controls and the administration of technology imports and exports may endanger national industrial security, technology security and other interests. In addition, there is the Exit and Entry Administration Law, as well as various systems restricting exit in civil and criminal proceedings.

This distinction is important. It means that Article 6 cannot turn a restriction that previously had no legal basis into a lawful restriction. Legality derives from the boundaries of authorization; conduct exceeding those boundaries may still be overturned in administrative reconsideration or administrative litigation, even when cloaked in the phrase "in accordance with the law." Therefore, the accurate formulation is not that "the exception clause legalizes illegality," but rather this: It may allow conduct exceeding the boundaries to remain undiscovered and uncorrected for longer.

This gray area is precisely where the system needs to close the gap. Procedural silence may not change the substantive right or wrong of an act, but it does concretely change the probability of correction.

II. Where the Gap Opens

The wording of the provision is not entirely without boundaries; "circumstances that may affect national security or the investigation of criminal cases" at least indicates a direction. What is genuinely disturbing are three structural gaps.

First is the openness of "other circumstances." In legislative technique, the word "other" is generally supposed to be interpreted as covering matters of the same kind—that is, circumstances comparable to the matters listed previously in terms of their nature, urgency and need for confidentiality. But at the implementation level, if detailed rules, guidelines or cases do not draw this line, "other" can easily be treated as a catch-all—general administrative convenience, internal disciplinary grounds, local considerations relating to maintaining stability, economic disputes, and even disputes over speech could all be casually placed inside it.

Second is the excessively low threshold for judging what "may affect" something. Note that the provision does not require that something "actually affect" national security or a criminal investigation, but only that it "may affect" them. This is a predictive and highly subjective standard, one that is almost impossible to disprove after the fact. The cost of invoking it therefore approaches zero.

Third is that the discretion represented by "may" has no supporting constraints. The provision does not stipulate who must approve a decision not to inform, whether reasons must be stated, how long confidentiality may be maintained, whether supplementary notification is required after the period expires, or whether there is a review mechanism. When a discretionary power is not accompanied by procedural costs, the center of gravity in practice will slide toward the direction of least resistance.

When the three are combined, the result is this: An option that should have been exceptional has acquired all the conditions necessary to become a routine option.

III. The Cost: Relief Rights Becoming Meaningless

The most direct consequence of this article falls on the right to know; and the true cost of damage to the right to know is the rendering of the right to relief meaningless.

Legal avenues for relief have not been eliminated. The person concerned may still apply for administrative reconsideration or file an administrative lawsuit. But if they do not know which authority made the decision, what facts it was based on, which provision it relied upon, or how long the time limit is, then reconsideration and litigation are like shooting at a target blindfolded——they cannot identify the defendant, articulate the issues in dispute, or produce evidence. The right remains intact on paper, but in practice it approaches zero.

Second is the loss of predictability. One basic function of the rule of law is to enable people to anticipate the consequences of their conduct and arrange their lives accordingly. When a person is stopped at the airport and told, "You cannot leave the country," but is given no reason, they cannot determine whether this is a procedural problem that can be resolved in a few weeks or a substantive restriction that may last for several years. The secondary harm caused by this uncertainty is often more serious than the restriction itself.

Third is the failure of the principle of proportionality. Prohibiting exit is a major interference with citizens’ fundamental rights and should comply with the requirements of necessity and least harm. But when reasons are not disclosed, the duration is unclear and no time limit is set for review, scrutiny of whether the measure is "necessary" or "excessive" cannot even begin.

Finally, there is the erosion of trust. Even if the exercise of power is undertaken in good faith this time, that may not be the case next time. When people feel that "even if one obeys the law, it is impossible to know when or why one may be restricted," the guiding function of rules will fail——a loss deeper than any individual case.

IV. The Scenario That Most Warrants Vigilance Is "After Returning"

Regarding the scope of impact, a calm delineation is needed: Article 6 regulates the notification procedure at the stage of exit from China, directly binding the decision-making authorities and port-of-entry enforcement authorities within the country. For people who have been abroad for a long time and are not currently entering China, it will not produce any effect out of thin air; for people of Chinese descent who no longer hold Chinese nationality, whether it applies depends on their specific status and the corresponding entry and exit rules.

The genuinely high-risk scenario is when a person has already returned to China and, while preparing to leave again, discovers passively at the port of entry that their exit has been restricted, without obtaining the full reasons. This is the structural landmine to which international students, employees posted abroad, cross-border businesspeople and people of Chinese descent holding foreign permanent-residence status should pay the greatest attention.

Once someone falls into this scenario, the associated consequences are concrete and urgent: being unable to return on schedule to a job, school or place of residence abroad; missing visa and residence-permit deadlines, or even jeopardizing permanent-residence status because of exceeding the permitted period outside the country; disrupting the care of minor children, property leases and medical arrangements; and facing the risk of breach of employment relationships, academic obligations, leases and cross-border commercial contracts. Moreover, because they have no information about the reasons, the person concerned may not even be able to provide a credible explanation or request an extension from an overseas employer, school or immigration authority.

What policymakers should pay even greater attention to is the feedback at the group level. Once the expectation that "returning to China is easy, but leaving again is difficult" takes shape among overseas communities, it will self-amplify into rumors and anxiety, suppressing the willingness to make normal visits to family, invest or engage in academic exchanges. This runs directly counter to the policy goals of attracting overseas talent and maintaining connections with overseas communities.

V. Returning the Exception to Its Proper Place as an Exception

Preventing the expansion of exceptions cannot rely solely on calls for self-discipline; it requires a combination of "tightening substantive rules + internal procedural controls + external oversight." The following directions are all operationally feasible.

Tighten substantive interpretation. Through implementing rules, law-enforcement guidelines or guiding cases, clarify the rule of interpretation for matters of the same kind: "other circumstances" should be limited to matters comparable to national security and criminal-case investigations in terms of nature, urgency and the need for confidentiality, while a negative list should expressly exclude general civil disputes, administrative disputes, administrative convenience and internal disciplinary grounds.

Increase the cost of invoking the exception. Applying the non-notification provision should require approval at a higher level, rather than being decided independently by lower-level law-enforcement personnel——the level of approval itself is a mechanism for caution. At the same time, even if the person concerned is not informed, a written decision should be created, stating the facts, legal basis, need for confidentiality and applicable period, and should be fully archived. Leaving a record is the prerequisite for subsequent oversight.

Set a time limit for confidentiality. Non-notification should follow the principle of the shortest necessary period, with a clear confidentiality period and a system of regular review; once the reason for confidentiality disappears, the reasons and avenues for relief should be proactively provided. Confidentiality without a time limit is equivalent to a permanent black box.

A baseline right to know. Even if the specific reasons cannot be disclosed, the person concerned should be given a minimum amount of information——for example, the existence of the restriction, the level or category of the authority that made the decision, and the channel through which a review can be requested—so that they at least have the possibility of "knocking on the right door," rather than going around in circles among multiple departments.

External oversight and data disclosure. Establish independent verification and judicial-review channels, and regularly disclose the total number of times the exception clause has been invoked, the distribution of types, the average duration and the rate of removal. The disclosure of statistical data is itself a constraint: If an exception is used extensively, the numbers will speak first.

The cost of errors. For restrictions that are confirmed to be erroneous or have exceeded their duration, there should be clear mechanisms for lifting and correcting them, as well as reasonable compensation. Making abuse costly is more effective than requiring law-abiding people to prove their innocence.

Conclusion

Article 6 establishes "notification" as the principle, which is progress——it recognizes that citizens have the right to know about coercive measures directed at them. But it simultaneously leaves an exception with a very low threshold, blurred boundaries and insufficient procedural safeguards, without providing the key to close the door at the same time.

Every legal system needs exception clauses, and the need for confidentiality in matters of national security and criminal investigations is real. The question has never been whether there are exceptions, but rather "who determines that an exception exists," "what record is left after it is determined," and "how long before it must return to the normal state."

The quality of a set of regulations often lies not in how beautifully its principles are written, but in how strictly its exceptions are constrained. The direction of Article 6 is correct. What truly needs to be watched next is how the implementing rules fill those gaps——ensuring that "may not inform" remains an option that can be activated only when reasons are stated, rather than becoming a default habit that requires no explanation.

Date: August 3, 2026

This article was written on the basis of the official text of the State Council’s Provisions on the Administration of Exit and Entry (State Council Decree No. 841, 2026) and related legal analysis.