Rights Defense Network: Interpretation of China's Policies, Laws and Regulations (March 2026) (Issue 19)

Editor's note：New regulations continue to emerge，and their provisions may appear comprehensive on paper，but if detached from implementation，they ultimately amount to nothing more than dead letters。This issue focuses on the effectiveness and real-world risks of implementing new laws and regulations，and while acknowledging the original intentions of the legislation，it pointedly highlights the central issue that China's rule of law can never avoid：how can good laws achieve genuinely good governance，and can new regulations avoid being “incompatible with local conditions”。

The newly revised Regulations on Funeral and Interment Administration ban “ash houses” and regulate exorbitantly priced cemeteries，with the original intention of protecting people's livelihoods and eliminating entrenched abuses。But in reality，will grassroots authorities selectively implement them？Will so-called “hidden charges” return under a different name？Will the thresholds and procedures for ecological burial subsidies deter the people who genuinely need them？These obstacles hidden in the details will affect the final results far more than the provisions themselves。

The Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate have amended the judicial interpretation on environmental criminal cases，criminalizing monitoring fraud and accountability for illegal emissions，with the intention of protecting clear waters and green mountains。But during implementation，how can authorities prevent “cracking down on the small while letting the big ones off”？How can the survival of enterprises be balanced with environmental protection requirements？Could “one-size-fits-all” enforcement emerge，causing innocent people to suffer while allowing the actual offenders to exploit loopholes？There can be no ambiguity whatsoever regarding the boundaries of power or the standards of enforcement。

New regulations in the field of food safety regulate livestreaming e-commerce and food sales，with the original intention of ensuring safety and protecting consumers。But driven by profit，can platforms' review capabilities keep pace？Will the boundaries of the law be wantonly crossed？Could reasonable innovation in new business models be strangled by excessive regulation？Apparently strict provisions may well produce a gap between strictness at the top and laxity below when implemented in practice。

New regulations on online governance and oversight of administrative enforcement，while regulating the exercise of power，may also impose new constraints on individual rights。How can a balance be found between maintaining public order and protecting citizens' lawful rights and interests？Could “excessive regulation” encroach on private spaces？The blurred boundaries of power and inconsistent enforcement standards have always been hidden concerns in the advancement of the rule of law。

The vitality of the rule of law has never lain in perfection on paper，but in proper implementation。This issue's interpretations do not avoid problems or gloss over contradictions，but directly address the key pain points in implementing new regulations。It reminds readers not only to make good use of rules to defend their rights，but also to beware of good laws degenerating into “formalism”，because only by confronting the difficulties of implementation can genuinely good laws and good governance be put into practice。

Contents

I、Eight departments jointly issue measures for determining the impact of online platforms on minors

II、The General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council issue an opinion and deploy pilot work to extend rural land contracts for another 30 years after the expiration of the second-round contracts

III、The National People's Congress revises the Fisheries Law, which is signed and promulgated by the president

IV、The State Council promulgates the newly revised Regulations on Funeral and Interment Administration

V、The Ministry and Administration jointly promulgate the new Environmental Air Quality Standards

VI、The Regulations on Food Safety Supervision and Administration of Livestreaming E-Commerce officially take effect

VII、The Sichuan Province Regulations on the Promotion of Family Farms officially take effect

VIII、The Ministry of Culture and Tourism issues the new Measures for Handling Tourism Complaints

IX、The National People's Congress votes to adopt the Law of the People's Republic of China on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress

X、Douyin upgrades its rules for combating online violence

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I、Eight departments jointly issue measures for determining the impact of online platforms on minors

The Cyberspace Administration of China and seven other departments jointly issued the Measures for Determining Online Platform Service Providers with Huge Numbers of Minor Users and Significant Influence on Minor Groups on February 11, 2026, and it will take effect on April 1。The measures aim to standardize the criteria for identifying highly influential online platforms, consolidate platforms' primary responsibilities, and strengthen online protection for minors。The document specifies the conditions for identifying two types of key platforms: those with huge numbers of minor users and those with significant influence on minor groups. It comprehensively considers factors including user scale, usage time, and content attributes。Platforms meeting the conditions are required to proactively apply for identification and are subject to dynamic management. Identified platforms must strictly fulfill special protection obligations, including implementing minor modes, content review, and risk prevention and control, and establish a more precise and effective online protection system for minors。(详÷情请见：

https://www.cac.gov.cn/2026-02/28/c_1774010730056867.htm）

Analysis：The eight departments' joint issuance of these measures, viewed from a human-rights perspective, does far more harm than good. In essence, they use “minor protection” as a pretext to control information, curtail rights, and erode freedoms。The benefits are merely superficial; the drawbacks are substantive. The measures attempt to clarify platforms' responsibilities and appear to strengthen online safety for minors, but are actually a packaging of expanded power。

1. They violate minors' rights to expression and access to information。Using “user scale” and “degree of influence” to make blanket determinations, and forcing platforms to implement minor modes and content filtering, classifies vast amounts of information as “off-limits”。Minors are deprived of the right to access diverse information and express themselves freely; their rights to know and freedom of thought are crudely curtailed, and their development is confined within an “information greenhouse,” contrary to modern human-rights principles。

2. They violate the privacy and autonomy rights of platforms and users。Platforms are required to collect and monitor data on minor users, excessively gathering behavioral trajectories and usage preferences, turning privacy into a regulatory tool。At the same time, platforms are forced to assume review obligations far beyond reasonable limits, seriously squeezing their commercial freedom and operational autonomy. Adult users are also forced to accept information restrictions because of platforms' blanket controls, depriving them of the right to use the internet on an equal basis。

3. The standards are vague, leaving enormous room for rent-seeking。Expressions such as “significant influence” and “other factors” are highly elastic, enabling regulatory departments to arbitrarily expand the scope of identification while leaving administrative power insufficiently constrained. To avoid liability, platforms can only over-censor, creating a chilling effect of “better to kill by mistake than let anything through.” The space for online speech is narrowed further, and both minors and adults become victims of power control。

In summary, under the banner of “protection,” the measures systematically violate minors' rights to development, expression, and privacy, as well as adult users' right to equality and platforms' autonomy. They represent a regression in human-rights protection in the digital age。

II、The General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council issue an opinion and deploy pilot work to extend rural land contracts for another 30 years after the expiration of the second-round contracts

On March 18, the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council issued the Opinions on Properly Conducting Pilot Work to Extend Rural Land Contracts for Another 30 Years after the Expiration of the Second-Round Contracts, making comprehensive arrangements for nationwide pilot work on extending contracts。The opinions make clear that rural land contracts will be extended for another 30 years after the expiration of the second round, while upholding collective ownership of rural land by farmers and the foundational status of household contracting operations. The principle of “major stability and minor adjustments” must be strictly followed: no wholesale redistribution, and no illegal adjustment or recovery of contracted land, so as to effectively maintain the basic stability of existing land-contracting relationships。The document requires the procedures for extending contracts to be standardized, with full-chain management covering confirmation and registration of rights, public announcement and review, and contract signing and certificate issuance. It calls for legal protection of farmers' land-contracting rights, respect for farmers' wishes, and protection of their rights to know, participate, and supervise. The pilot program will be rolled out in an orderly manner nationwide, and through steady progress it will further consolidate the basic rural operating system and provide solid institutional support for food security, rural revitalization, and rural social stability。(详÷情请见：

http://www.news.cn/politics/zywj/20260318/344c54251a45450d89639fdac7a4e1ba/c.html）

Analysis：The deployment by the General Offices of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council of pilot work to extend rural land contracts for another 30 years was originally intended to stabilize land rights and safeguard farmers' right to development. But viewed from a human-rights perspective, its benefits are only superficial guarantees, while its drawbacks involve deeper erosion of rights. In essence, collective interests impose one-sided pressure on individual human rights, and many provisions conceal hidden deficiencies in human-rights protection。

The supposed benefit is merely an illusory appearance of stability：The policy promises “major stability and minor adjustments.” Although this appears to protect farmers' rights to contract and operate land, it actually binds farmers firmly to the land, depriving them, in the name of “stability,” of the right to independently choose their development paths. The so-called “protection” is no more than a gentle cover for restricting freedom; the drawbacks are at the core of the infringement of human rights。

First, it violates farmers' right to independent development。The policy strictly prohibits wholesale redistribution and illegal land adjustments, appearing to safeguard rights but actually solidifying the existing pattern of land distribution. Some landless farmers and new members of rural communities are completely excluded from land rights, losing the opportunity to improve their lives through land; their rights to subsistence and development are artificially severed. At the same time, farmers' dependence on land is reinforced, making it difficult for them to freely transfer land or shift to other employment, and seriously depriving them of occupational choice。

Second, it violates the equal rights of collective members。The principle of “major stability and minor adjustments” gives grassroots organizations broad discretion. In some areas, they may use “minor adjustments” as a pretext for favoritism and opaque dealings, resulting in unfair allocation of land resources. The basic human right of collective members to enjoy land rights equally is undermined, creating new stratification of rights。

Furthermore, it infringes on farmers' freedom of property rights。Although the policy emphasizes confirmation and registration of rights, it imposes numerous restrictions on land transfers, mortgages, and other rights. Under the urban-rural dual structure, it is difficult for farmers' land rights to be converted into equal urban capital. The free circulation and appreciation of property rights are indirectly deprived, creating a stark contrast with the property rights enjoyed by urban residents。

Clearly, in the name of “protection,” the policy seriously erodes farmers' rights to independent development, equality, and property by solidifying land relations and restricting the movement of rights. It is a typical regression in human-rights protection amid imbalanced urban-rural development, and urgently requires institutional improvements to remedy these rights deficiencies。

III、The National People's Congress revises the Fisheries Law, which is signed and promulgated by the president

On December 27, 2025, the 19th session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People's Congress adopted the revised Fisheries Law of the People's Republic of China, which was promulgated by the president in Presidential Order No. 63 and will take effect on May 1, 2026。This is the first comprehensive revision of the law since it took effect in 1986. It expands from six chapters and 50 articles to seven chapters and 90 articles, establishing a more complete fisheries governance system。

The new law focuses on aquaculture standards, fishing controls, resource conservation, quality and safety, and enforcement and supervision. It improves the systems for fishing quotas and vessel, net, and gear indicators, and strictly regulates fishing vessels with no registration, no certificates, or no licenses; strengthens the management of aquaculture wastewater, seedling quarantine, and aquatic-product safety; improves ecological restoration and stock-enhancement conservation mechanisms; clarifies the rights and responsibilities of all parties; increases penalties for violations; protects the lawful rights and interests of fishery producers; coordinates fisheries development, ecological protection, and national food security; and provides legal support for the green, high-quality development of fisheries。

(For details, see：https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202512/content_7052923.htm

and http://www.npc.gov.cn/c2/c30834/202512/t20251226_450663.html）

Analysis：The revised Fisheries Law was promulgated on December 27, 2025, and formally takes effect on May 1, 2026。Viewed from a human-rights perspective, this law, presented as protecting ecology and regulating development, displays an obvious imbalance of rights: although it stabilizes the order of fisheries production institutionally, it seriously squeezes the subsistence, development, and property rights of grassroots fishers through excessive administrative controls. Its drawbacks far outweigh its benefits。

From a positive perspective, the new law clarifies the basic rules of fisheries production and makes institutional arrangements for aquatic-product safety and ecological restoration, thereby safeguarding the public interest and long-term industrial order to some extent. But this weak positive value cannot conceal its substantive infringement of individual rights。

Using ecological protection and total-quantity controls as a pretext, the law substantially tightens fishing permissions and strengthens aquaculture restrictions, directly pushing subsistence fishers who depend on fisheries to the edge of survival. Fishing quotas, vessel and net indicators, and aquaculture standards are layered one upon another. Although this appears to be scientific management, it disregards the modes of production on which fishers have relied for generations and indirectly deprives them of their most basic means of subsistence. At the same time, the provisions are excessively elastic, enforcement discretion is expanded too far, and the boundary between legality and illegality is unclear, making selective enforcement and rent-seeking highly likely。

More worrying is that the new law places excessive emphasis on administrative convenience and authority while neglecting fishers' rights to know, participate, and appeal, and lacks mechanisms for remedying the rights of disadvantaged groups. So-called industrial development and ecological protection ultimately come at the cost of the personal, property, and development rights of ordinary fishers. In essence, this is improper pressure by public power on private rights, contrary to the fundamental spirit of human-rights protection。

IV、The State Council promulgates the newly revised Regulations on Funeral and Interment Administration

On January 7, 2026, the State Council promulgated the newly revised Regulations on Funeral and Interment Administration, which will take effect on March 30, 2026。The regulations were adopted at an executive meeting of the State Council on November 14, 2025. They represent the second comprehensive revision since 2012 and contain eight chapters and 73 articles. This revision highlights the public-welfare nature of funeral and interment services, makes clear that basic funeral and interment services will gradually be incorporated into the scope of basic public services, implements service-list management, strictly prohibits charges outside the list, and curbs excessive fees. The regulations standardize full-chain supervision of “death, funeral, burial, and memorialization,” promote land-saving ecological burials, strictly control luxury cemeteries and burial sites for the living, and stipulate that rural public-welfare cemeteries in principle may not charge villagers. They also increase penalties for violations, establish clear punishment standards for arbitrary charges and illegal cemetery construction, effectively protect the public's funeral and interment rights, and promote the development of funeral and interment services under the rule of law and in an environmentally friendly manner。(For details, see：

https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202601/content_7054169.htm）

Analysis：The above-mentioned revised regulations take effect on March 30, 2026. Compared with the previous version, the new rules place greater emphasis on public welfare, regulate fees, and strictly control luxury cemeteries and burial sites for the living. Although they appear to benefit and facilitate the public, they continue and reinforce rigid controls such as mandatory cremation and region-wide uniform requirements; from a human-rights perspective, their drawbacks far outweigh their benefits。

The new rules' highlight is their clarification that basic funeral and interment services should be public-welfare services, which will reduce exorbitant funeral fees and, to some extent, ease the public's economic burden. They may also help curb land waste and the culture of comparison. But these superficial benefits cannot conceal their serious infringement of citizens' personal dignity, religious beliefs, customary rights, and right to choose independently。

The regulations' biggest problem is that, in the name of environmental protection and conservation, they in practice enforce cremation. Cremation should be encouraged rather than mandatory, yet the new rules impose one-size-fits-all requirements in many places, ignoring ethnic customs, religious beliefs, and families' wishes, and forcibly depriving the deceased of the traditional destination of burial. In essence, this tramples on personal dignity and autonomy in funeral and interment arrangements. In reality, large numbers of people still bury ashes after cremation, meaning that land is not genuinely conserved; instead, an additional cremation stage is added, causing air pollution and increasing funeral costs. The supposed ecological benefits are merely self-deception。

At the same time, crude implementation of the policy, with grassroots authorities applying pressure at every level to meet targets, can easily trigger extreme incidents such as forced relocation of graves and forced exhumation and cremation, seriously hurting people's feelings. Excessive intervention by public power in the final dignity of life, sacrificing individual rights for administrative convenience, violates public order and good customs and constitutes a systematic infringement of citizens' customary, religious, and property rights. What appears to be standardized administration is in fact indifference to and suppression of basic human rights。

V、The ministry and administration jointly promulgate the new Environmental Air Quality Standards

On February 13, 2026, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment and the State Administration for Market Regulation jointly issued the new Environmental Air Quality Standards (GB3095—2026), which formally took effect on March 1 and replaced the 2012 standards. This is the third comprehensive revision since the standards were issued in 1982. The core of the new rules is a substantial tightening of pollutant limits: the annual average Grade I limit for PM2.5 is tightened to 10μg/m³ and Grade II to 25μg/m³; limits for PM10, SO₂, NO₂, and other pollutants are also tightened. The standards will be implemented in stages: March 1, 2026, through December 31, 2030, is a transition period during which transitional limits apply; from January 1, 2031, the final stricter standards will apply nationwide. The revision benchmarks World Health Organization guidelines, strengthens ecological protection and safeguards for public health, forces upgrades to industrial and energy structures, and promotes continued improvement in air quality。(For details, see：

https://www.mee.gov.cn/ywgz/fgbz/bz/bzwb/dqhjbh/dqhjzlbz/202602/t20260225_1144419.shtml）

Analysis：The new Environmental Air Quality Standards were issued in February 2026 and formally took effect on March 1，compared with the old 2012 version, the most prominent change is the comprehensive tightening of pollutant concentration limits. The annual average Grade II standard for PM2.5 was sharply tightened from 35 micrograms/cubic meter to 25 micrograms/cubic meter. Key indicators including PM10, ozone, and nitrogen dioxide were also tightened, bringing the standards closer overall to World Health Organization guideline values and presenting a stricter governance orientation at the textual level。

From a human-rights perspective, the theoretical value of the new standards lies in their attempt to protect the public's right to health and environmental rights through stricter environmental indicators, using clearer numerical requirements to promote pollution control and reduce the risk of disease caused by air pollution. This should have been a positive measure to protect basic livelihood rights. But in the process of implementation, the standards not only struggle to play a real role, but also expose deep contradictions in institutional design and enforcement, creating hidden infringements of the public's rights to know, health, and fair development。

In industrially dense and heavily industrialized areas, the long-term failure to meet air-quality standards is already an open fact, yet the new standards are almost meaningless in these regions. Many highly polluting enterprises obtain local protection because of their status as state-owned enterprises or major local taxpayers. Environmental departments often engage in soft enforcement, turning a blind eye, neither conducting strict inspections nor imposing penalties in accordance with the law. To meet assessment targets and respond to public oversight, many localities deliberately conceal genuine monitoring data; all figures released publicly are embellished and kept within the compliance range. The public is entirely unable to learn the true air-quality conditions around them, and its right to know is systematically deprived。

More worrying is that this situation of strict standards but ineffective enforcement has created a deeply unfair distribution of rights. Those actually subject to strict controls are often small and medium-sized operators with weak capacity to withstand risk and ordinary members of the public, while key enterprises that truly cause pollution remain outside effective regulation for long periods. Public power in environmental governance clearly favors capital and power groups, while ordinary people's rights to health and subsistence are relegated to a secondary position. High standards become a textual game for appearances, while pollution, data fraud, and unfair enforcement coexist. The public suffers health damage from continuing air pollution but cannot obtain accurate information or effective remedies. Such environmental standards appear to protect the public interest, but through distorted implementation they continually erode citizens' most basic rights to subsistence and development, reducing environmental human rights to an empty slogan。

VI、The Regulations on Food Safety Supervision and Administration of Livestreaming E-Commerce officially take effect

On December 28, 2025, the State Administration for Market Regulation officially promulgated the Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Livestreaming E-Commerce Operators' Fulfillment of Primary Food-Safety Responsibilities as SAMR Order No. 120. They take effect on March 20, 2026. This is China's first specialized regulatory system targeting food safety in livestream sales. The new rules systematically clarify the food-safety responsibilities of livestreaming platforms, hosts, livestream-room operators, food producers and operators, and other parties, comprehensively regulating the entire process of livestream sales. Relevant parties must strictly fulfill obligations including incoming-goods inspection, ledger records, and qualification review, and are prohibited from using livestreams to sell expired, spoiled, illegally sourced, improperly labeled, or otherwise unsafe food. They also strictly regulate false advertising, exaggerated efficacy claims, and misleading consumers, and prohibit the use of filters, special effects, or other means to conceal the actual quality of food. The regulations further detail supervision, inspection, and legal liability, establish routine monitoring mechanisms, and impose strict legal penalties for violations, effectively protecting consumers' food safety and lawful rights and interests。(For details, see：https://www.cfsn.cn/news/detail/3/330397.html）

Analysis：The regulation is intended to fill the gap in food-safety supervision of livestream sales. From a human-rights perspective, its original intention is to protect consumers' rights to health, know, and fair transactions, and to curb false advertising and substandard-food abuses by clarifying the responsibilities of platforms, hosts, and other parties. This was a positive legislative attempt to protect public rights. But in its actual operational logic and enforcement space, the regulation also displays clear bias and enforcement loopholes, creating hidden pressure on the rights of both small and medium-sized operators and ordinary consumers, with the drawbacks more prominent。

First, the new rules clearly tilt the allocation of responsibility toward platforms and regulators while ignoring the rights to subsistence and development of small hosts and individual merchants. Many small businesses that rely on livestreams to sell local specialties and homemade food lack complete quality-testing, storage, and qualification conditions. The stringent responsibilities and entry thresholds established by the new rules amount to raising barriers to entry indirectly, causing many grassroots operators to lose their livelihoods and institutionally ignoring their right to fair development。

Second, although the regulation appears to strengthen oversight, it can easily become a tool for selective enforcement, further damaging the right to equality. Leading livestream rooms and large institutions often have stronger public-relations and compliance capabilities and are more likely to receive lenient treatment even when problems arise. Small hosts, by contrast, may face heavy fines and account closures as soon as they violate a provision. Regulators may easily end up “cracking down on the small while letting the big ones off,” while major violations that consumers genuinely need to guard against remain difficult to pursue fully, leaving the right to health without firm protection。

Furthermore, the new rules do not fundamentally resolve the problem of information asymmetry, and consumers' right to know remains disadvantaged. Supervision relies on platforms' self-inspection and ex post penalties; prior disclosure and full-process traceability mechanisms are incomplete. Many merchants can still evade oversight through concealed means, and false advertising and falsified qualifications are difficult to eliminate. The public appears to have gained another layer of institutional protection but remains in an information blind spot, unable to truly understand the actual safety of food. The supposed protection of rights remains largely on paper and is difficult to turn into a real safety barrier。

VII、The Sichuan Province Regulations on the Promotion of Family Farms officially take effect

The Sichuan Province Regulations on the Promotion of Family Farms were adopted by the 22nd session of the Standing Committee of the 14th Sichuan Provincial People's Congress on November 26, 2025, officially promulgated on November 27, and took effect on March 1, 2026. They are the first provincial-level special regulations on family farms issued nationwide. The regulations contain 28 articles and establish in law the status of family farms as operating on a moderate scale “with the family as the unit.” They focus on resolving difficulties involving land, financing, and talent. The regulations establish an all-chain support system: regarding land, they support lawful transfers and protect the priority rights of members of collective economic organizations and their priority rights to renew contracts; regarding funding, they provide fiscal subsidies and encourage innovative financial and insurance products; regarding talent, they include operators within the scope of training, professional-title assessment, and social-security support. They also expressly prohibit leaving cultivated land idle and misappropriating subsidies, incorporate development into rural revitalization assessments, and support construction of the Tianfu Granary and the modernization of agriculture。(For details, see：http://scdfz.sc.gov.cn/gzdt/zyhy/content_189671）

Analysis：As the country's first local regulation specifically governing family farms at the provincial level, the Sichuan Province Regulations on the Promotion of Family Farms safeguard the rights of agricultural operators through legislation and have pioneering significance for human-rights protection. Their institutional value should be fully recognized, while their shortcomings should also be assessed objectively。

From a positive perspective, the regulations directly respond to rural people's most fundamental rights to development, property, and work. Through systematic support for land transfers, fiscal assistance, financial services, and talent development, they provide family-based agricultural operators with stable institutional expectations and give ordinary farmers and people returning home to start businesses fairer operating opportunities and development space. The regulations emphasize farmers' right to transfer land voluntarily and prohibit forced transfers, thereby protecting farmers' basic subsistence to some extent. They also build a legal bridge for small farmers to connect with modern agriculture and have important value for maintaining fairness in rural society and protecting the rights of those engaged in food production。

At the same time, the regulations still have obvious shortcomings in the balance, accessibility, and safety net of rights protection. In practice, policy benefits are more likely to flow toward larger family farms with better conditions. Ordinary small farmers, farmers in remote areas, and elderly farmers often find it difficult to enjoy subsidies, credit, training, and other resources equally, creating structural inequality in the right to development. Although the regulations emphasize the principle of voluntariness in land transfers, they lack stronger constraints and remedy mechanisms for possible forceful intervention by grassroots authorities, low-priced transfers, and unilateral breaches of contract, leaving disadvantaged farmers with insufficient voice. In addition, the regulations emphasize support and incentives but lack effective risk-sharing and social-security coordination for the natural and market risks faced by family farms. When operators suffer losses or disasters, their basic livelihood and development rights lack a stable safety net, leaving the rights-protection system incomplete。

VIII、The Ministry of Culture and Tourism issues the new Measures for Handling Tourism Complaints

The Ministry of Culture and Tourism promulgated the new Measures for Handling Tourism Complaints in Order No. 14, which formally took effect on March 15, 2026, while the 2010 version was repealed. The new rules contain 32 articles and address the three major difficulties in protecting tourists' rights: difficulty proving claims, difficulty transferring cases, and slow compensation. They establish a new mechanism for handling complaints that covers the entire chain, operates efficiently, and provides strong safeguards. The biggest highlight is the reshaping of jurisdiction and transfer mechanisms: tourists may choose any complaint channel in the place where the travel agency is located, where the contract was signed, or where the itinerary dispute occurred, breaking the limitations of territorial jurisdiction and effectively avoiding buck-passing among tourism authorities. Processing has been significantly accelerated: a response must be given within two days after a complaint is accepted; ordinary disputes must be concluded within 60 days; and for complex cases, the entity complained against must be required to provide a written response within five days. Delays will be incorporated into credit supervision. In protecting rights, the new rules further strengthen advance compensation and coordinated penalties. In cases including travel agencies abandoning groups, leaving tourists stranded, or failing to meet service-quality standards, tourism service quality deposits may be used lawfully for advance payment to quickly resolve tourists' financial difficulties. They also establish mechanisms linking complaint handling with administrative penalties and credit sanctions, and implement multidimensional joint governance against forced shopping, false advertising, arbitrary itinerary changes, and other illegal acts, providing stronger legal support for tourists defending their lawful rights and interests。(For details, see：

https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202602/content_7057887.htm）

Analysis：The new Measures for Handling Tourism Complaints took effect on March 15, 2026. Compared with the 2010 version, they make clear improvements in complaint jurisdiction, processing deadlines, and advance compensation. From a human-rights perspective, their legislative intention is to better protect tourists' rights to fair transactions, remedies, and property security. By opening complaint channels, shortening processing periods, and strengthening deposit compensation, they enable tourists to defend their rights more conveniently when subjected to forced shopping, being abandoned by tour groups, shortened itineraries, and other infringements. This is an institutional strengthening of consumers' basic rights and has positive significance。

But the new rules still have obvious shortcomings in substantive fairness, enforcement effectiveness, and protection of disadvantaged groups. Their apparently complete procedural design is unlikely to genuinely resolve the real-world difficulties of defending tourism rights. Compared with the previous version, although the new rules broaden the choice of jurisdiction and allow tourists to complain in multiple places, they do not fundamentally resolve the risks of overlapping powers and buck-passing. Multiple jurisdictions may instead wait for one another, shift responsibility, or delay action, while tourists must still spend substantial time and energy collecting evidence and communicating. The right to timely relief is difficult to realize in practice。

The advance-compensation mechanism appears powerful but in fact has high thresholds and limited scope. Most minor disputes and service-quality disputes cannot trigger compensation from the deposit, and tourists often can only accept mediation and compromise, leaving property losses inadequately compensated. At the same time, the new rules remain relatively soft in restraining tourism operators and lack rigid sanctions against malicious infringers and repeat violators. Penalties are disproportionate to illegal gains and cannot create an effective deterrent。

More prominently, the new rules provide clearly insufficient protection for disadvantaged groups such as elderly tourists and independent travelers. These groups often have weak evidentiary abilities and limited legal knowledge and remain disadvantaged when filing complaints, while the measures do not provide supporting measures such as free legal aid or simplified channels for presenting evidence. In addition, the measures focus on ex post handling and lack prior prevention and whole-process supervision. Tourists' personal safety and right to fair transactions can still only be protected passively, substantially weakening the forward-looking and practical effectiveness of rights protection。

IX、The National People's Congress votes to adopt the Law of the People's Republic of China on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress

On March 12, 2026, the Fourth Session of the 14th National People's Congress voted to adopt the Law of the People's Republic of China on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress. President Xi Jinping signed Presidential Order No. 71 promulgating it, and it will take effect on July 1, 2026. The law contains seven chapters and 65 articles. Centered on “forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation,” it systematically regulates ethnic equality, cultural protection, common development, rights protection, and legal responsibility. It expressly prohibits discrimination and oppression against any ethnic group and guarantees the equal rights of all ethnic groups in education, employment, medical care, cultural inheritance, and other areas; establishes an Ethnic Unity and Progress Publicity Week; strengthens exchanges, interaction, and integration; clarifies the rights and obligations of the government, society, and citizens; and establishes legal liability for conduct undermining ethnic unity. It is China's first basic law at the national level specifically devoted to promoting ethnic unity and progress。(For details, see：

http://www.npc.gov.cn/c2/c30834/202603/t20260313_453201.html）

Analysis：The law establishes the principle of ethnic equality through legislation. From a human-rights perspective, its positive significance lies in legally protecting the equal, development, cultural, and protection rights of all ethnic groups; prohibiting ethnic discrimination; emphasizing common development; and providing an institutional foundation for safeguarding the lawful rights and interests of ethnic minorities and promoting exchanges, interaction, and integration among all ethnic groups. It has important declarative significance for protecting citizens' equal participation in social life and equal sharing of the fruits of development。

But viewed from the perspective of actual rights protection and cultural continuity, the law still has obvious shortcomings. It is overly general in protecting core rights such as ethnic minority language rights, cultural-inheritance rights, and autonomy over customs, and its rigid constraints are insufficient. Although the law mentions protecting ethnic cultures and languages, it does not establish enforceable safeguards for ethnic-language education or the transmission of traditional customs. In reality, many ethnic-minority areas continue to be dominated by Chinese-language education, the space for using ethnic minority languages continues to shrink, and cultural inheritance faces weakening. Language rights and cultural development rights have not been adequately protected。

While emphasizing a sense of community, the law shows insufficient respect for rights based on difference. It lacks clear prohibitions and punishment mechanisms for forced assimilation and cultural erasure, and imposes few constraints on simplistic, one-size-fits-all practices in local implementation. In grassroots governance, many ethnic traditions, religious practices, and ways of life are often restricted in the name of unified administration, and citizens' cultural freedom and right to choose their customs are not fully respected。

 

In addition, while safeguarding the equal development rights of ethnic minorities, the law lacks detailed measures addressing substantive equality in resource allocation, employment opportunities, and educational equity. It may therefore remain at the level of policy declarations and fail to genuinely change development gaps. The foundation of ethnic unity lies in cultural respect and equal rights. If unity is emphasized while substantive protection of cultural diversity and autonomous rights is weakened, genuine unity will be difficult to achieve and the cultural identity and sense of rights gained by ethnic minority communities may instead be weakened. There remains a considerable gap before the human rights of ethnic groups are comprehensively protected。

X、Douyin upgrades its rules for combating online violence

On March 23, the Douyin platform officially released and implemented the Douyin Online Violence Governance Standards (2026 Edition), comprehensively upgrading its online-violence governance system, clarifying determination standards, strengthening protection for special groups, and taking tougher action against malicious online violence. The new standards publicly set out four governance principles for the first time: avoiding harm, special protection, privacy and personal-information protection, and balancing the public interest, thereby clarifying the boundary between online violence and reasonable expression. They also define three core elements for identifying online violence—targeting, harmfulness, and scale—to avoid one-size-fits-all mistakes that injure legitimate public-opinion supervision. The new rules highlight the principle of special protection, giving priority handling and applying stricter controls to minors, elderly people, people with disabilities, and other groups. They crack down hard on gang-based and organized online violence, as well as serious circumstances including AI-generated disinformation at scale, doxxing, privacy leaks, coordinated attacks by multiple accounts, and extortion. The platform will adopt graduated measures including deletion, blocking, account bans, and identity verification; where suspected criminal violations are involved, it will preserve evidence and report to public-security organs. In addition, the platform has improved protective functions such as “one-click protection against online violence,” provided users with legal, psychological, and other assistance, and improved the precision and timeliness of handling online violence。(For details, see：

https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1860456977129703785&wfr=spider&for=pc）

Analysis：Douyin's formal upgrade of its rules for governing online violence, as a nationwide short-video platform, concerns not only its own ecosystem but also has exemplary significance for the online content environment as a whole. Combating online violence and protecting a healthy online space are social consensuses and responsibilities that platforms should fulfill. But in implementation, clear standards and precise boundaries are the keys to whether the new rules can work effectively。

Douyin has huge numbers of users of all ages and covers diverse content scenarios including news, commentary, daily life, culture, and entertainment. Users interact frequently and information spreads efficiently. The original intention of this upgrade is to curb malicious attacks, privacy leaks, group harassment, and other forms of online violence, protect the lawful rights and interests of ordinary users and content creators, and meet public expectations for a healthy online environment。

But online expression is complex, and it is easy for ambiguity to arise between legitimate criticism, public-opinion supervision, and online violence. If the criteria are too general and enforcement lacks flexibility, reasonable expression of views and factual oversight may be mistakenly targeted, invisibly compressing the normal space for speech. How to precisely distinguish “malicious attacks” from “rational questioning,” and how to define “privacy leaks” versus “supervision of public events,” are central difficulties in implementing the platform's rules。

As the entity responsible for implementing governance, the platform needs to establish open and transparent detailed criteria, refine the elements for identifying online violence, and keep channels for appeals and review open, avoiding one-size-fits-all management. At the same time, it should balance freedom of expression with rights protection, safeguarding the public's right to reasonable expression and supervision while curbing online violence。

In short, Douyin's upgrade of online-violence governance is a positive step. Only by building firm boundaries through clear standards and prudent implementation can it truly achieve a win-win outcome between combating online violence and protecting freedom of expression, enabling platform governance to combine strength with sensitivity。