China Human Rights Defenders: Interpretation of China's Policies, Laws and Regulations (August 2026) (Issue 24)

Editor's note: These policies have been introduced in rapid succession recently, spanning the three major areas of social governance, correcting livelihood-related shortcomings, and safeguarding rights. They may appear to represent an across-the-board upgrade in governance, with precise efforts being made everywhere, but in reality most are merely swords brandished on paper. Unless the chronic problems in grassroots implementation are addressed, even the best top-level designs will ultimately be no more than mirages.

The three deployments in social governance, at the end of the day, have still not escaped the inertia of campaign-style rectification. The campaign to combat organized crime and eliminate local criminal forces is being further deepened, targeting the resurgence of criminal forces at the grassroots level. Yet the lesson that past concentrated rectification efforts left only a superficial effect remains fresh, and there have been no shortage of cases in which problems revived once the spotlight passed; the cleanup and rectification of clan and kinship associations directly targets the risk of the degeneration of informal grassroots organizations, but although the signs of branch organizations can be removed, the deeply entrenched local networks of interests cannot be severed. Unless the soil in which clan forces become intertwined with grassroots power is eliminated, one group will be cleared only for another to emerge; the new regulations on entry and exit administration reconstruct the boundaries of the national border. The rules may be in place, but the flexibility in the scale of grassroots enforcement has always been the greatest variable in putting rules into practice.

The four rectification measures in the livelihood sphere each hit the public's pain points, yet each is unable to escape the fate of being “a gust of wind.” Five departments have joined forces to rectify abuses in the matchmaking sector. Marriage scams and false advertising have been targeted for years, but they remain like weeds that cannot be eradicated: regulators repeatedly investigate, while operators simply change their disguises and continue; the China Cuisine Association has completely abolished the titles of master chefs and regional designations, eliminating a batch of empty titles and honors, but the business of buying titles and profiting from reputations in the industry will flourish under another name; the environmental code specifies penalties for noise disturbing residents and writes the right to quiet into law, but when residents complain about noisy square dancing below their homes or nighttime construction at worksites, how many reports will actually lead to penalties being imposed? Eight departments have strengthened safeguards for agricultural irrigation water. The institutional red line has been preserved, but local governments want investment and GDP, while polluting enterprises secretly or openly discharge pollutants. Whether those responsible for protecting water dare to confront them in earnest has never been an optimistic question.

The two expansions in rights protection are even more typical “upgrades of rights on paper.” The revision of the housing provident fund regulations lays out the right to adequate housing in full, but enterprises that fail to pay or underpay provident funds are everywhere, and local regulators generally turn a blind eye out of concern for the business environment. Grassroots workers cannot even realize their most basic right to have contributions made, let alone enjoy the benefits of withdrawals and loans; the second review of the draft amendment to the Lawyers Law piles up protections for legal practice and legal aid in an attractive manner, but it does not touch at all on the reality that lawyers dare not accept sensitive cases or face retaliation when they do, and it does nothing to break the unwritten rules under which local authorities obstruct meetings with clients and access to case files. Without provisions for guarantees backed by rigid accountability, it is ultimately just a promise made to lawyers and a performance staged for the parties involved.

It has always been easy to write provisions but difficult to implement them. If policies merely add provisions on paper without taking real action in enforcement; if efforts are devoted only to top-level design without cutting through local obstruction, the result will be nothing more than a series of polished performances on paper. The quality of governance has never been measured by how many documents are issued, but by whether ordinary people's rights can truly and tangibly be held in their own hands.

Contents of this issue

I. Nationwide deployment of a one-year campaign to deepen the fight against organized crime and eliminate local criminal forces

II. Five departments jointly deploy a special campaign to rectify abuses by matchmaking agencies

III. China Cuisine Association completely abolishes titles including “Master Chef” and revokes all regional food designations

IV. New Ministry of Civil Affairs regulations include branch organizations of clan and kinship associations in the cleanup and rectification

V. Environmental Code permits fines for refusing to correct noise disturbances affecting residents

VI. Eight departments jointly issue a notice seeking to strengthen safeguards for the security of agricultural irrigation water

VII. State Council promulgates the “Provisions on Exit and Entry Administration”

VIII. State Council revises the “Regulations on the Administration of Housing Provident Funds”

IX. National People's Congress submits the draft amendment to the Lawyers Law for a second review

I. Nationwide deployment of a one-year campaign to deepen the fight against organized crime and eliminate local criminal forces

On July 31, a national video conference on the campaign to combat organized crime and eliminate local criminal forces was held in Beijing, making systematic arrangements for deepening the campaign nationwide. The meeting made clear that, beginning in July 2026, the country would conduct a one-year campaign to deepen the fight against organized crime and eliminate local criminal forces. On the basis of continuing to crack down severely on traditional criminal forces, crimes involving organized crime and local criminal forces carried out through online platforms and by means of “soft violence” will be made key targets of the crackdown. At the same time, the authorities will advance the rectification of disorder in various industries, the investigation of officials who provide protection, and the cutting off of criminal financial resources, in order to eradicate the soil that allows criminal forces to grow on all fronts. The meeting required strict handling of cases in accordance with the law throughout the process and adherence to the principle that “not a single criminal group is missed, and not a single non-criminal group is added,” so as to effectively ensure the public's sense of security. (For details, see: http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0801/c64094-40772036.html）

Analysis: The comprehensive launch of a new one-year campaign to deepen the fight against organized crime and eliminate local criminal forces is an important measure for protecting the public's basic human rights and maintaining social peace. Looking back at the previous campaign, authorities in various places struck hard, and a large number of criminal ringleaders who had run rampant in their localities were arrested and brought to justice. Overt crimes such as provoking trouble, forcibly taking over construction projects, and violently harassing others were effectively eliminated; the social security environment continued to improve; the public's sense of security increased significantly; and the rights to life, property, and normal business operations and development received solid protection. This fully demonstrates the great significance of combating organized crime and eliminating local criminal forces in laying a firm foundation for human rights protection.

As the governance system continues to improve, traditional criminal methods involving offline destruction, beatings, threats, and group harassment have been strongly curbed, and the forms of activity used by criminal forces have also quietly changed. Many lawbreakers have shifted to cyberspace to employ soft violence. In commercial competition, rather than using offline intimidation and suppression, they maliciously damage competitors' reputations and interfere with normal business operations through such means as maliciously posting batches of negative reviews, releasing false images, text, and videos in bulk, and spreading online rumors and defamatory statements, thereby infringing the legitimate rights and interests of business operators through new methods. Targeted rectification of online criminal forces and online soft violence, and remedying shortcomings in internet governance, are precisely what this campaign should do in response to changing circumstances and to protect the public's rights and interests.

Sound implementation of policies cannot be separated from cautious and standardized law enforcement. Human rights protection is reflected not only in severe punishment of crimes, but also in preventing the overreach of power. It should be recognized clearly that, under the pressure of special assessments and competition to achieve outstanding results, some regions with a relatively strong foundation in the campaign and relatively few outstanding problems may easily raise the standards for classification in order to “create achievements and make up targets,” upgrade ordinary civil disputes and general public-security problems into organized-crime cases, and thereby cause wrongful cases and harm the legitimate rights and interests of the parties involved. The boundaries are especially blurred in defining online soft violence. If the scale is mishandled, there is a risk that statements by self-media outlets that express normal suggestions or dare to speak out will be broadly classified as criminal, and that public-opinion supervision and reasonable criticism will be included within the scope of organized crime, further squeezing the normal space for expression.

The starting point of the fight against organized crime and local criminal forces is human rights protection; strictly observing judicial boundaries means holding the bottom line of human rights. In carrying out the special campaign, authorities must maintain the intensity of the crackdown while adhering to the principles of legality of crime and punishment and evidence as the paramount consideration, and clearly distinguish among organized-crime offenses, civil infringements, and normal public-opinion supervision. Only by both severely punishing new forms of criminal disorder and cautiously applying the standards for classification can the campaign steadily proceed along the path of the rule of law, genuinely protect citizens' lawful personal, property, and speech rights while maintaining social stability, and achieve the organic unity of combating crime and protecting human rights.

II. Five departments jointly deploy a special campaign to rectify abuses by matchmaking agencies

On July 28, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Cyberspace Administration of the Central Committee, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, and the State Administration for Market Regulation jointly issued the “Work Plan for the Special Campaign to Rectify Abuses by Matchmaking Agencies,” which was formally released to the public on July 31. The special campaign will end in February 2027 and will proceed in five stages: mobilization and deployment, self-examination and self-correction, investigation of problems, centralized rectification, and review and consolidation. The campaign focuses on seven prominent problems in the matchmaking sector that have drawn strong public complaints: violations in registration services; false advertising and marketing; “marriage proxy” fraud for profit; unfair standard-form clauses; disorderly fees; failure to verify identities; and the leakage and abuse of personal information. Multiple departments will coordinate to carry out centralized rectification, investigate and punish violations in accordance with the law, protect the legitimate rights and interests of marriage and relationship consumers, and promote the standardized and healthy development of the industry. (For details, see: https://www.mca.gov.cn/n2623/n2687/n2696/n2746/c1662004999980012252/content.html）

Analysis: From the perspective of human rights protection, the joint launch by five departments of a special campaign to rectify abuses by matchmaking agencies is less a routine exercise in industry governance than a correction of the regulatory priorities that have been misplaced for many years. As public governance has become increasingly precise in controlling online speech, matchmaking fraud that concretely infringes citizens' property rights and autonomy in marriage has long remained subject to lax enforcement and weak remedies.

The abuses in the matchmaking sector are by no means merely individual agencies' violations, but constitute nearly industry-wide systemic dishonesty. From false personal profiles and elaborate “marriage proxy” schemes to exorbitant service fees and inducements to consume, large numbers of people of marriageable age—especially single men in disadvantaged positions in the dating and marriage market and their families—have become targets to be exploited amid anxiety about finding partners. They may lose tens of thousands of yuan in service fees in relatively minor cases, or in more serious cases have their savings drained through layer upon layer of schemes and be forced into debt. This directly pierces two basic human rights: first, citizens' right to the security of their property; and second, the right to autonomy in marriage. When marriage and dating services are turned into carefully designed scams, an individual's legitimate need to seek a partner instead becomes a vulnerability to be exploited, causing simultaneous damage to personal dignity and economic interests.

What deserves even greater reflection is the structural imbalance in regulation. Compared with the high-intensity, refined governance applied to online expression, matchmaking fraud has long occupied a lenient zone in which “no complaint means no investigation.” Because of difficulties in producing evidence and ambiguity in classification, victims often can only see their cases dismissed as civil disputes. The cost of violations is far lower than the benefits, objectively allowing bad money to drive out good in the industry. For precisely this reason, the public's central concern about the special campaign is not that enforcement will be too strict, but that it will repeat the pattern of “thunderous noise but little rain”: investigating only surface-level violations, fining only small institutions, and treating lightly the fraud groups and chains of interests hidden behind the industry, allowing the abuses to revive once the spotlight has passed.

Human rights protection has never been an abstract concept. It is hidden in every avenue for seeking redress after being defrauded and in the force of law enforcement addressing people's livelihood-related pain points. The true test of this joint rectification by the five departments is whether it can break down departmental barriers, uncover the fraudulent nature behind so-called “civil disputes,” handle a number of cases with deterrent force, and raise the cost of violations in the industry. Only by directing regulatory forces toward areas that concretely infringe the public's interests, making wrongdoers pay a price, and giving victims a way out can authorities provide the most genuine protection for people's livelihood and human rights.

III. China Cuisine Association completely abolishes titles including “Master Chef” and revokes all regional food designations

On July 23 and 24, the China Cuisine Association issued two announcements in succession, comprehensively cleaning up various titles and designations in the industry. The July 23 announcement made clear that all personal titles, certificates, and specially designated clothing bearing titles including “China Master Chef” (“Famous Chef”) and “China Master of Catering Services” (“Famous Chef”) that had been evaluated and issued by the association over the years would immediately become invalid. The relevant evaluation documents would also be abolished, and no organization or individual may continue to conduct publicity or commercial endorsements in these names. The July 24 announcement announced the revocation of all regional designations previously awarded to localities, including “hometowns,” “capitals,” and “food landmark cities.” All plaques were immediately abolished and may no longer be used for official publicity or external promotion. The cleanup was carried out to implement the requirements of the “Administrative Measures for the Evaluation and Commendation Activities of Social Organizations” and standardize the order of industry evaluation and commendation. The measures formally took effect on August 1. (For details, see: http://news.cnr.cn/native/gd/20260803/t20260803_527744908.shtml）

Analysis: From a human rights perspective, the China Cuisine Association's successive announcements abolishing all “Master Chef” and “Food Hometown” titles represent a belated correction of longstanding abuses in the industry. When plaques and designations degenerate into businesses with fixed prices, what is harmed is consumers' right to know and the right of all business operators to fair competition.

For a long time, this kind of association rating had already become an open gray business: paying fees in exchange for titles and buying plaques with money, then turning around and using them as commercial endorsements. What appears to be a mutually willing transaction in fact creates deep market injustice: businesses that package themselves by buying plaques seize traffic and harvest trust, while legitimate operators who painstakingly improve their products are instead squeezed out of room to survive. Behind bad money driving out good is an overt trampling of the right to fair competition in the market; ordinary consumers are misled by false titles and pay premiums in exchange for services that do not live up to their names, suffering harm to both their property rights and their right to know.

This cleanup deserves recognition, but its shortcomings are also glaring: the rectification covers only national-level associations. The various “master,” “famous establishment,” and “specialty hometown” titles awarded by provincial and municipal cuisine associations have not been abolished at the same time. As long as the chain of “selling plaques—providing endorsements—profiting” continues to exist at the local level, the abuses will continue under different disguises, and consumers will still be confused by all kinds of titles.

At the end of the day, genuine industry reputation has never been awarded or bought. The reputation of Qianjiang crayfish is the result of the market voting with its feet; the reputation of Wuchang fish is a consensus accumulated over a thousand years. True practitioners of both virtue and skill build their standing on their craft and have no need for a certificate to gild them.

Protecting human rights in the sphere of people's livelihoods requires severing this distorted ecosystem of “living off one's title.” Only by extending the scope of the cleanup down to local associations at every level, completely eliminating the soil for fee-based ratings, and allowing market competition to return to a contest of quality and ability can authorities genuinely maintain a fair market order and protect the legitimate rights and interests of consumers and law-abiding operators.

IV. New Ministry of Civil Affairs regulations include branch organizations of clan and kinship associations in the cleanup and rectification

On August 1, the Ministry of Civil Affairs' “Administrative Measures for Branches and Representative Offices of Social Organizations” formally took effect. The measures were promulgated on June 30 as Order No. 85 of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and establish a 12-month transition period for rectification, requiring all noncompliant branches and representative offices to complete cleanup and standardization by July 31, 2027. The new regulations expressly prohibit social organizations from establishing four types of branches, including branches of surname-based clan and kinship organizations. They also strictly prohibit regional branches, organizations with highly overlapping memberships, and organizations with duplicate business activities. The measures regulate the naming of branches and the titles of those in charge, while strengthening the primary management responsibilities of social organizations. The cleanup has attracted public attention, with some practitioners of clan and kinship culture worrying that various genealogy-revision conferences and clan fellowship activities could be affected and halted. At present, authorities have made clear that the cleanup targets clan and kinship branches established under social organizations; the boundaries of cultural activities spontaneously organized by the public remain to be further clarified through subsequent implementing rules. (For details, see: https://www.mca.gov.cn/gdnps/n2445/n2575/n2577/c1662004999980011739/attr/452293.pdf）

Analysis: The Ministry of Civil Affairs' administrative measures have formally taken effect, expressly prohibiting social organizations from establishing branches based on surnames and kinship, with existing problems to be comprehensively cleaned up within a 12-month transition period. From a human rights perspective, rectifying abuses in which people use the name of kinship to collect money is a legitimate step to protect the public's property rights. But a blanket ban that makes no distinction between good and bad in practice squeezes citizens' cultural space for association and is a typical case of throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

Kinship ties are a folk cultural tradition that has continued in China for thousands of years. Revising genealogies and uniting clans, holding ancestral rites and fellowship activities, and helping vulnerable members of the clan are essentially cultural rights and freedom of association based on blood ties. In reality, many kinship organizations operate in a standardized manner, led by respected local elders, with open and transparent finances. They perform functions including passing on family traditions and consolidating local community ties, and have never touched the legal red line. Such spontaneous folk cultural connections do not depend on official plaques for their legitimacy. Yet they are now being swept up in the cleanup because of their status as branches attached to social organizations, meaning that administrative bans are needlessly shrinking the space for normal folk cultural activities.

It cannot be denied that serious problems do exist in the kinship sphere. Some people use the banner of kinship to cheat and collect money, and crimes such as fraud and illegal fundraising have even emerged. This has not only emptied the savings of many families but also damaged the reputation of kinship culture. Striking hard at such tumors is entirely legitimate and necessary. But the essence of governance lies in precise enforcement, not in a simple and crude blanket ban. If authorities merely ban social-organization branches without distinguishing right from wrong, what is ultimately eliminated may not be the fraud groups that have operated for years; instead, compliant cultural activities may lose their support, while genuine lawbreakers can continue to move among the public under a different disguise.

What deserves even greater reflection is the deviation in the logic of regulation: authorities are often too lenient toward abuses involving the collection of money that genuinely harm the public's interests, yet repeatedly tighten the standards for spontaneous cultural ties among the public. The core of human rights protection is to leave sufficient space for lawful activities and draw a red line around unlawful conduct. Rather than abolishing all kinship branches in a blanket manner, authorities should establish a graded and categorized regulatory mechanism, guide standardized kinship organizations toward compliant registration, and at the same time concentrate resources on precisely combating crimes committed in the name of kinship. Only by allowing lawful activities to flourish and controlling unlawful ones can authorities genuinely respect citizens' cultural rights and freedom of association and achieve the original purpose of regulation.

V. Environmental Code permits fines for refusing to correct noise disturbances affecting residents

On August 15, the Environmental Code of the People's Republic of China formally took effect. The code comprehensively regulates four types of noise pollution: industrial production, construction, transportation, and social life. It makes clear that as long as noise interferes with another person's normal life, work, or study, it may be deemed noise pollution even if emission standards have not been exceeded. Regarding such everyday noise problems as square dancing, indoor renovations, and loudspeaker advertising, which have prompted strong public complaints, the code stipulates that law enforcement departments must first provide persuasion and education and order correction. If the person or entity still refuses to correct the problem after dissuasion or mediation, an individual may be fined between 200 yuan and 1,000 yuan, and an organization may be fined between 2,000 yuan and 20,000 yuan. (For details, see: https://ecro.mee.gov.cn/fgbz/fl/202604/t20260416_1148993.html）

Analysis: With the formal implementation of the Environmental Code, the control of noise pollution has now left the era of “soft enforcement.” From a human rights perspective, this is a belated guarantee of rights. While public governance has become increasingly precise in controlling many areas, the disturbance caused by everyday noise endured by residents day after day has long remained in a lax state of “persuasion as the main approach, with little effective punishment.” Citizens' rights to rest and tranquility have consistently lacked a firm legal shield.

Noise from daily life that disturbs residents is essentially an infringement of the human rights of the majority by a minority. The reason square-dancing noise has become a problem affecting the entire country lies precisely in the long-standing ambiguity surrounding the boundaries of rights: exercise and recreation are legitimate rights, but they cannot be based on the cost of insomnia, anxiety, and disruption of normal life for nearby residents. In the past, law enforcement could only issue verbal warnings, with compulsory measures few and far between. The cost of violations was virtually zero, effectively endorsing the jungle logic that “whoever has the loudest voice is right” and reducing law-abiding residents' right to tranquility to empty words.

The explicit provision that refusing to correct the problem may result in a fine of up to 1,000 yuan raises the cost of violations through economic leverage. Most people will not ignore the cost of money, and this precisely restores the rights of the weaker side. The “silent square dancing” model using headphones also balances the right to exercise with the right to tranquility and is a model of governance wisdom far superior to a simple and crude choice between banning and allowing.

But legislation must have both force and precision in enforcement. Authorities must not impose blanket accountability for noise from industrial production, construction, or transportation. Nighttime work for disaster relief, emergency repairs, and major livelihood projects serves broader public interests. When weighing the lesser of two harms, as long as noise-reduction measures are implemented and public-notice obligations fulfilled, the penalty provisions should not be applied mechanically. Imposing fines in all circumstances to meet law-enforcement targets will only drive governance toward another extreme and depart from the original purpose of protecting human rights.

Human rights have never been an abstract slogan. They are hidden in every night when people can sleep soundly and in a public order in which people do not cross one another's boundaries. Having laws to follow is only the starting point. Only by taking firm action against malicious disturbance while retaining flexibility for reasonable needs can the law truly become a powerful instrument for protecting people's livelihoods rather than a cold tool of punishment.

VI. Eight departments jointly issue a notice seeking to strengthen safeguards for the security of agricultural irrigation water

On August 17, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate formally released the “Notice on Further Strengthening the Prevention of Pollution Risks from Industrial and Other Wastewater and Ensuring the Safety of Agricultural Irrigation Water.” The document was jointly issued by the general offices of the eight departments on July 28 and is a supporting institutional document for the “Action Plan for the Protection and Treatment of Water Bodies Around the Public.” Focusing on the prominent risks posed to agricultural irrigation water by discharges from industrial enterprises and parks and livestock and poultry farms, the notice sets out measures in four areas: optimizing the spatial layout of industrial projects, strengthening full-chain controls over wastewater discharge, improving monitoring and early warning for irrigation-water quality, and deepening coordination between law enforcement and the judiciary. It focuses on regulating market access for construction projects in high-risk areas around farmland, advancing the upgrading and renovation of wastewater treatment facilities in industrial parks, and investigating and rectifying entities involved in pollution. It requires the formulation of problem lists by the end of 2026 and the orderly advancement of rectification, establishing a cross-departmental, full-cycle risk-prevention and control system, fully ensuring that irrigation-water quality meets standards, and protecting food production and the quality and safety of agricultural products. (For details, see: http://mee.gov.cn/ywgz/ssthjbh/swrgl/202608/t20260817_1164157.shtml）

Analysis: From the perspective of top-level design, the notice on irrigation-water safety jointly issued by eight departments is comprehensive and clearly allocates responsibilities, and its intentions cannot be called anything but good. But within the practical logic of county-level governance, this institutional goodwill can easily be eroded layer by layer by local protectionism. Those who ultimately suffer are always the farmers who depend on the land.

The primary problem is the disguised protection of polluting enterprises under a performance-oriented system. In many places, industrial enterprises are pillars of tax revenue and showcases of official performance. To stabilize GDP growth, regulatory departments often “raise their hands high but bring them down lightly” when dealing with enterprises that secretly or incompletely discharge pollutants: when inspections arrive, production is suspended to put on a show; when the inspection team leaves, pollution resumes as before. So-called deadlines for rectification and acceptance inspections for meeting standards are mostly performances understood by all. Environmental law enforcement becomes a rubber band, and the cost of violations for enterprises is nearly zero. In essence, local governments forcibly transfer the costs of development onto farmers' farmland and health.

The second problem is the severe disconnect between monitoring data and people's actual experience. Farmers see irrigation water turn black and foul-smelling and crops irrigated with it suffer reduced yields or total crop failure, yet official test reports repeatedly say the water “meets standards.” Sampling sites are deliberately selected and testing indicators avoid the key issues; professional data become a fig leaf for local protectionism. Farmers clearly suffer harm but cannot produce evidence “recognized by the authorities.” Even their most basic rights to know and to present evidence are rendered meaningless. This is the most hidden form of infringement of the right to subsistence.

An even more hidden danger lies in the regulatory vacuum over abandoned farmland. Some remote plots remain uncultivated for years and become natural destinations for enterprises to discharge pollutants—no one is watching and no one will pursue accountability, so wastewater is discharged directly into ditches in abandoned fields. But soil and groundwater pollution may be irreversible. If abandoned land is allowed to conceal pollution today, by the time farmers want to resume cultivation, the land may have completely lost its agricultural value. What is being mortgaged is the foundation of survival for several generations.

At the end of the day, irrigation safety has never suffered from a lack of documents or systems, but from a lack of implementation and resolve. If local governments continue to stand on the side of enterprises and official performance, any amount of top-level design will become a dead letter. Only by breaking through barriers of local protectionism, making farmers' actual experiences a standard for assessment, and assigning accountability for dereliction of duty to specific individuals can authorities truly hold the bottom line of survival represented by farmland.

VII. State Council promulgates the “Provisions on Exit and Entry Administration”

On July 31, the State Council formally promulgated the “Provisions on Exit and Entry Administration” (State Council of the People's Republic of China Order No. 841). The provisions were signed by the premier on July 22 and adopted at an executive meeting of the State Council on June 29. They will take effect on September 15 and constitute supporting administrative regulations for the Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People's Republic of China. The provisions establish a system for preventing security risks to Chinese citizens traveling abroad and for promptly issuing warnings about security risks overseas; clarify the circumstances in which exit may be prohibited, and provide that persons who fraudulently obtain documents or illegally enter or leave the country may be prohibited from leaving China for between six months and three years; impose record-filing management on agencies providing exit and entry intermediary services; and strictly prohibit violations including false advertising and assisting in the fabrication of materials. At the same time, the provisions strengthen personal-information protection and make clear that a decision prohibiting exit must notify the person concerned in writing of the facts, reasons, and avenues for relief, thereby safeguarding the lawful rights and interests of persons entering or leaving the country. (For details, see: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202607/content_7077173.htm）

Analysis: The provisions state in black and white that “a person concerned must be notified in writing of the facts, reasons, and avenues for relief when exit is prohibited.” At the legislative level, this fills a shortcoming in procedural justice, and the original intention deserves recognition. But viewed in the real-world context, this goodwill toward rights on paper will probably find it difficult to break through the longstanding maladies of invisible border controls.

The most glaring absurdity in reality is that people “learn they are under control only after reaching the checkpoint.” Many people book their flights and hotels and arrange their itineraries, only to learn that they have long been on a list prohibiting them from leaving the country when they are stopped by border inspectors at the port. With no document, notification, or explanation beforehand, the parties involved have no way of knowing who made the decision, which provision of law it was based on, or through what channel they can appeal. Their most basic right to know is completely nullified.

Although the new regulations establish an obligation of written notification, they also leave an ambiguous opening allowing notification to be withheld in cases involving “national security, criminal investigations, and other circumstances.” It is precisely this unclearly defined “exception” that can easily be expanded without limit in practice. From economic disputes to internal controls, and from industry regulation to identity registration, all kinds of restrictions can be dressed in the cloak of “special circumstances,” erasing statutory procedures and turning rights visible on the surface into operations carried out in a black box.

Even more alarming is the spread of controls outside the law. The statutory circumstances for prohibiting exit have clear boundaries, but in reality the passports and travel permits for Hong Kong and Macao of large numbers of public employees, workers at state-owned enterprises, and even people deemed “sensitive” because of their identities are collected centrally by their work units. They must obtain approval through layer upon layer of procedures before they can receive the documents for private travel. Worse still, some people are included in the border-control system solely on the basis of internal notices and registration, without statutory procedures or a written decision, while remaining completely unaware throughout. In essence, this practice uses administrative convenience as a pretext to impose restrictions outside the law, transforming citizens' statutory right to enter and leave the country into a “favor” that can be obtained only after layers of approval and allowing the logic of control to completely replace the boundaries of rights.

Without the right to know, the right to relief is empty rhetoric. Border control, as an important measure restricting citizens' personal freedom, should observe the strictest procedural justice, yet for a long time it has operated in a gray zone of vague procedures. If new regulations cannot make responsibility for notification concrete, narrow the scope of exceptions, and pursue accountability for unlawful border controls, they will ultimately be only a declaration of rights on paper. The dignity of the rule of law has never depended on how complete the text of a provision is, but on whether every ordinary person's rights can be realized in practice. Breaking through the black box of border controls and ensuring that every restriction can withstand public scrutiny would be the most basic form of respect for human rights.

VIII. State Council revises the “Regulations on the Administration of Housing Provident Funds”

On August 18, the State Council promulgated the “Decision of the State Council on Amending the Regulations on the Administration of Housing Provident Funds” (State Council Order No. 844). The new regulations will take effect on September 20, 2026. This revision further implements rights related to adequate housing and includes individual industrial and commercial households and people in flexible employment within the scope of voluntary contributions; removes the income-ratio restriction on withdrawals for rent; adds channels for withdrawals to pay for the renovation of self-occupied housing and property fees; and advances the mutual recognition and handling of provident funds across regions. The regulations strengthen protection of contributors' property rights and expand coverage of housing保障. As administrative regulations concerning social security, whether the institutional benefits can be fully realized will still depend on the issuance of supporting local rules and the implementation of supervision over conduct such as enterprises' failure to make contributions. (For details, see: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202608/content_7078478.htm）

Analysis: At the textual level, the recently revised “Regulations on the Administration of Housing Provident Funds” can be called a positive expansion of housing-protection rights: including people in flexible employment within the scope of voluntary contributions, removing the income threshold for rental withdrawals, adding channels for withdrawals to pay for self-occupied housing renovation and property fees, and advancing nationwide mutual recognition of contribution records. Every adjustment corresponds to the human rights content of the right to adequate housing, and the institutional design on paper cannot be said to be incomplete.

But viewed in the real-world context, this revision looks more like a performance of “textual perfectionism” regarding rights. The actual implementation gap has not been bridged, and the deep-seated shortcomings far outweigh the benefits on paper.

First, equality is a false expansion. The so-called “voluntary contributions” by people in flexible employment essentially transfer the employer's contribution responsibility entirely to individuals. Without enterprises sharing the contributions, the provident fund system has little practical appeal for low-income workers in new forms of employment and will ultimately become a welfare tool for high-income freelancers, instead worsening the division of housing benefits among different groups. Moreover, because all implementing details are delegated to localities, with no uniform nationwide minimum standard, disparities in rights among regions will only grow wider.

Second, statutory rights face an absence of enforcement. The revision adds provisions concerning the use and withdrawal of funds, but does not strengthen rigid penalties or routine supervision for the chronic problem of enterprises broadly failing to pay or underpay housing provident funds. Under the habitual local mindset of “protecting the business environment,” regulatory leniency has long been an unwritten industry rule. Tens of millions of workers cannot realize even their most basic statutory right to have contributions made, making all subsequent rights, including withdrawals and loans, castles in the air.

Third, the right to movement remains stuck in place. The so-called nationwide mutual recognition remains limited to contribution records; core barriers involving loans across regions and the cross-regional pooling of funds remain untouched. Housing保障 for migrants is still firmly divided by household registration and geography, and citizens' equal right to reside has not genuinely broken through administrative boundaries.

At the end of the day, this revision is more an economic tool for propping up the property market and boosting consumption than human rights legislation centered on protecting citizens' right to housing. No matter how attractive the provisions look, without a compulsory fulfillment mechanism and a minimum guarantee for people at the bottom, they remain rights written only on paper.

IX. National People's Congress submits the draft amendment to the Lawyers Law for a second review

On August 25, the 24th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People's Congress conducted a second review of the draft amendment to the Lawyers Law. Linking up with the Legal Aid Law, the draft makes clear that lawyers are encouraged to participate in public-interest legal services and advances full coverage of lawyer defense in criminal cases, ensuring the right of low-income groups and groups facing special difficulties to obtain legal remedies on an equal basis. The draft adds provisions safeguarding rights in legal practice, requiring public security, procuratorial, judicial, and justice organs to establish and improve systems for safeguarding lawyers' rights in practice and to protect lawyers' lawful practice rights and interests in accordance with the law. It also regulates restrictions on public officials entering the legal profession after leaving office and improves provisions supporting the training of personnel for foreign-related legal services. (For details, see: http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2/c183/c12816/index.html and http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2/c30834/202608/t20260825_456910.html）

Analysis: Judging solely from its text, the draft amendment to the Lawyers Law submitted for a second review may be called a top-level expansion of judicial human rights protection. Advancing full coverage of criminal defense, improving safeguards for rights in legal practice, and expanding the scope of legal aid all target obvious pain points in past judicial practice. But if the polished surface of the provisions is stripped away, this revision has not touched the core source of lawyers' difficulties in practice. It looks more like an increase in rights at the level of individual provisions than genuine institutional relaxation.

The most central problem is that the draft's language on safeguarding rights in legal practice remains at the level of declarations of principle. The document only generally requires public-authority organs to “establish and improve systems for safeguarding lawyers' rights in practice,” while setting no clear accountability mechanism or procedure for pursuing responsibility for such common practices as obstructing meetings with clients, restricting access to case files, framing lawyers under labels such as “obstructing testimony,” or local officials ordering retaliation and suppression against lawyers. Safeguards without teeth are essentially dead letters: local authorities will continue to intervene as they have, and the risks of lawyers' practice will not genuinely be reduced by amending the law.

More hidden and more fatal than overt obstruction is the risk of professional retaliation that has long existed in sensitive cases. The draft says nothing about protecting lawyers practicing in sensitive cases involving local interests, mass incidents, or political persecution. Under the existing governance structure, lawyers who take on such cases often face professional retaliation, such as harassment involving their licenses or investigations into them. Bar associations subordinate to local judicial systems are fundamentally incapable of providing effective support for lawyers seeking to protect their rights. As long as the retaliatory hand of local power is not genuinely restrained, no matter how much the right to defense is emphasized, it will ultimately turn into lawyers' self-censorship to “seek advantage and avoid harm,” while the parties' right to defense becomes no more than a mirage.

On the legal-aid side, the paper promise of full coverage likewise cannot conceal the substantive gap in quality. Full coverage of criminal defense has been promoted for many years, but the shortage of grassroots lawyers is enormous. A large number of appointed defenses have been reduced to defenses that merely “go through the motions and make up the numbers”: meeting the client once and reading the defense statement once is considered completion of the task. The draft continues to expand public-interest legal services but provides no corresponding mechanism for directing resources toward grassroots lawyers. High-quality legal resources nationwide remain heavily concentrated in developed cities, while people in remote areas and at the bottom of society continue to find it difficult to obtain genuinely effective legal assistance. Judicial equality remains, to a considerable extent, on paper.

At the end of the day, lawyers' rights are never merely professional benefits for lawyers themselves, but an extended line of defense for citizens' rights. If a revision of the law only adds provisions without tackling the hard problems, writes principles without establishing accountability, and discusses top-level design without resolving local interference, it will ultimately be yet another instance of paper-based human rights congratulating itself.